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1. 
It is taken for granted that there are some conflicts between 
externalists and internalists. Indeed both parties ceaselessly 
attack each other and defend themselves. Against this opinion, 
Agassi, in his paper, 'Externalism' 1 , raises the question whether 
there are any conflicts between internalism and externalism. His 
answer to this question is naturally negative and I am of the same 
opinion. But his writing is slightly ambiguous and hard to 
understand. In this short paper, I will try to make it clear that 
there is no conflict between internalists and externalists, but a 
positively peaceful coexistence. 
2. 
In the beginning, Agassi makes fun of the historians who ignore 
internal factors of science---he calls them 'pure externalists'---
as 'the shelter of ignorance. ' 2 Such historians fortunately can 
write some history of science without understanding any content of 
science. As usual his criticism is quite sharp, probably because he 
is a Jew; generally a Jew's mind is full of critical spirit. (This 
explanation, you know, has nothing to do with the question whether 
Agassi's criticism is sharp or not. As you will see later, the 
externalists who regard the science as one of ideologies cannot deny 
that there is some true content or false content in science.) The 
internalists, of course, ignore such purely external historians. 
For pure externalists do not raise any problems to the internalists. 
So there cannot be any conflicts between them. 
3. 
So far so good. However, in this world there exist impure 
externalists3 who do not ignore the internal factors. How do not 
they ignore the internal factors? What do they say about the 
internal factors without ignoring them? I am neither an internalist 
nor an externalist because of my ignorance both of the content of 
science and the social factors of science. I just want to know what 
sort of relation exists between the externalists and the 
internalists. My position is like an outsider who observes the 
conflicts between the Jews and the Arabs. 
Either peaceful coexistence; cooperation, competition or 
conflicts; mutual denial , the offence-defence relation? 
'Agassi, J., 1978, Externalism, Manuscrito, Vol.2, No.1. 
2 Ibid., p.68. 
' Impure externalists are those who intend to explain the internal 
part of science from some external factors, or try to abolish the 
demarcation between the internal and the external of science. 
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4. 
Whereas there is an indifferent coexistence between pure 
externalists and internalists, it seems to most people that there 
cannot be coexistence but conflict between impure externalists and 
internalists. Though Agassi suggests the competing relation 'each 
to get more attention, public support, etc.' 4 I do not think their 
relation is a competition in the usual sense. For in order to 
compete, a common aim is required, but the common aim which Agassi 
mentions may be only a secondary one. For example, a sprinter and a 
scientist might have a common aim to wish to be famous. However, 
for a sprinter the primary aim is to run, for example, one hundred 
meters as fast as possible, on the other hand, for a scientist the 
aim is to search for the truth. 
Agassi's suggestion of the existence of competition between 
internalists and externalists5 is not persuasive, and he does not 
show the possibility of cooperation. 
5. 
We have to turn to Agassi's opinion about the question of the 
existence of conflicts between externalists and internalists. 
Agassi seems to be far from agreeing about the existence of 
conflicts between them. However, the readers of Agassi's paper 
might suspect that Agassi avoids the very point of conflicts in 
spite of his perceiving it. For the one paragraph which appears to 
deal with the issue of conflict is vague and confusing. Agassi 
writes as follows: 
I have thus far presented classical inductivism, with its view 
of science as the autonomous search for truth, as internalist par 
excellence, and classical Marxism, or a variant of it, with its view 
of science as a part of the social process (class-struggle) as the 
opposite, the denial that internalism can be kept pure. This 
picture is false and needs correction. Indeed I wish to declare 
that as far as the disagreement could be put as plainly as there was 
hardly any interest in the debate, that interest flared up because 
matters did get out of hand --- and in quite a fascinating manner, 
may I add. 6 
I know that classical inductivism is false and needs correction. 
But does Agassi consider that the view of science as the search for 
truth is false and needs correction? Though his description is 
ambiguous and it is difficult to tell which part he thinks needs 
correction, I guess that Agassi agrees with the view of science as 
the search for truth. For he writes, 'In science the goal is truth, 
• Agassi[l978], p.68. 
'In the following by 'externalism' I mean 'impure externalism'. 
• Agassi[l978], p.74. 
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the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.' 7 Then does he think 
that classical Marxists' view of science as a part of the social 
process (class-struggle) needs correction? There is no answer. 
In the next paragraph, Agassi asks the following question whether 
this move [that is, when an internalist applying his theory 
encounters difficulties, he introduces external factors to overcome 
them) is quite kosher. This problem-setting is no longer a judge's 
one. In the rest of his paper, he seems try to defend the 
internalist way as being kosher. He has already been the defender 
of internalism, tacitly acknowledging the existence of the conflicts 
between internalism and externalism. 
A judge has to ascertain a point at issue from a relatively 
neutral standpoint. In one case two opponents might misunderstand 
each other. In another case there might be some apparent errors on 
one side or on both sides. In the above cases the problem can be 
settled by removing the misunderstanding or the errors. Or in fact 
there might be a genuine clash, due to insufficient evidence to 
settle the matter one way or the others, accordingly it might be 
impossible to settle the problem at present or even in the future. 
In which case is the alleged clash between the internalists and 
the externalists? 
6. 
The point of issue between the externalists and the internalists 
seems to be in the externalists' negation of inner logic of judging 
the truth or falsity of scientific knowledge. According to the 
externalists, any knowledge is existentially conditioned 
(Seinsverbundenheit des Wissens). However, the extent of the 
existentially conditioned ranges from the mild claim that pedigree 
of knowledge has no necessary relation to its validity, which is 
naturally compatible with internalism, to the extremely radical 
claim that knowledge is merely outcome of various social causes, for 
example, the reflection of class interests. 
In his classic book, Social Theory and Social Structure, 8 R. 
Merton analyzes the above relation closely, i.e., the relation 
between knowledge and existential basis held by Marx, Engels, 
Manheim, Durkheim, Scheler, Sorokin. 9 As an analysis of the 
externalist view mentioned above, his analysis is , in my opinion, 
so clear and exact that it will be worthwhile to review here. 
Merton classifies Manheim's view about the validity of knowledge 
under three major heads; Dynamic Criteria of Validity, Structural 
Warranties of Validity and Relationalism. Concerning Dynamic 
' Ibid. , p. 7 3 . 
• Merton R., 1968, Social Theory and Social Structure, Enlarged 
Edition, The Free Press, New York. 
• In this paper I take up only Marx, Engels, and Manheim. For the 
others do not insist the radical claim that there is a causal 
relation between the infrastructure and the superstructure. 
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Criteria of Validity, Merton says that as Shelting has shown, this 
view is untenable. 10 Manheim, however, tries to save this view by 
positing 'class position' of the 'socially unattached 
intellectuals,' though he perceives the difficulty of it. But as 
you know, this idea too, is untenable. 11 In fact, Manheim moderates 
this view considerably and holds the view of Relationalism. This 
view 'may be readily assimilated to those by Rickert and Max Weber,' 
12 According to this view, 'the validity of propositions is no longer 
ascertained through wissenssoziologische analysis but through direct 
investigation of the object. ' 13 
On Marx and Engels, Merton says, 'Marxist analyses are apt to 
have an excessive degree of "flexibility", about to the point where 
any development can be explained away as a temporary aberration or 
deviation ••• where the concept of "accident" provides a ready means 
of saving the theory from facts which seem to challenge its 
validity ••• (A] decisive question must be raised in order to 
determine whether we have a genuine theory: how can the theory be 
invalidated? In any given historical situation, which data will 
contradict and invalidate the theory? Unless this can be answered 
directly, unless the theory involves statements which can be 
contradicted by definite types of evidence, it remains merely a 
pseudo-theory which will be compatible with any array of data. ' 14 
Merton suggests Marxist theory is but a pseudo-theory. Here too, 
the kosher problem--- as Agassi calls it 15 --- occurs. The problem 
is whether the Marxists' method of defending infrastructural 
explanation of knowledge by using auxiliary theory is kosher or not. 
Accordingly both parties have to insist that our own theory is 
kosher and genuine but your theory is not kosher, therefore, it is 
mistaken or pseudo. This problem is quite interesting and very 
relevant to our problem. In this paper, however, I will only touch 
upon this problem later, for at present this problem is beyond my 
ability. 
Here I accept provisionally Merton's view of Marxist theory that 
it is non-kosher. 16 Thus, according to Merton, where Marxists state 
ambiguously, although their position seems to be the extremely 
radical one, their theory cannot be scientific and is untenable. On 
the other hand, as far as they s.tate clearly and specifically, their 
10 Merton[l968], pp.557-8. 
" Cf. Popper,K.R., 1945, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Vol.2, Chap.23, pp.212-23. 
"Merton[l968], p.559. 
" Ibid., p. 559. 
14 Ibid., p. 533. 
"Agassi[l978], p.74. 
" I do not necessarily regard the internalist way as kosher. See 
page 7. 
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position is the mild one. In short, the externalistsl explanation 
of the scientific knowledge by only external factors is mistaken, 
therefore, their attempt fails and internalism stands. 
If the internalists are mistaken in anything, it is that they 
misunderstood the externalistsl view and over-reacted, that is, 
attacked thern. 17 As a result, all the more the internalists gave the 
world the impression that their bias was revealed and shown to be 
false by the externalists. For the internalists, the best course of 
action was to ignore the externalists. 18 
The division of labour is supposed to have come existence in this 
way. The internalists (philosophers of science or methodologists) 
concern themselves with the internal logic of science and the 
externalists (sociologists or historians) concern themselves with 
the external aspect of science. Moreover, the externalists are 
subordinate to the internalists. For externalists cannot begin 
their work until they are handed over the irrational residue of 
science by the internalists. As far as the internalists' 
explanation is successful, i.e., scientific activities are rational 
in the light of the internalistsl criterion of rationality, there is 
no work for the externalists. The work which is given to the. 
externalists is to explain causally the errors or irrationality 
which scientists happen to do. Such an internalist approach becomes 
a fashion. And the externalists voluntarily or resignedly limit the 
domain of their investigation. However, such an unbalanced 
coexistence will not continue for long. 
7. 
Recently some sociologists opposed to such an internalist 
approach again attempted to explain the very content and nature of 
scientific knowledge from external factors. For instance, in his 
book, Knowledge and Social Imagery , D.Bloor criticizes that the 
hitherto sociology of knowledge is not the sociology of knowledge in 
general but 1 the sociology of error I 19 , and proposes the stronger 
programme in the sociology of knowledge which seems to be 
incompatible with Lakatosian internalist approach. 20 This programme 
consists of four tenets which are causality, impartiality, symmetry, 
and reflexivity. 21 In short, the aim of the sociology of knowledge is 
to explain all belief or knowledge, whether it is true or false, by 
17 For example. Popper, K. R. , Normal Science and its Danger, and 
Lakatos,!., Falsificationism and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 1970, 
ed. by Lakatos,!. & Musgrave,A., Cambridge University Press, London. 
18 I do not express my value judgment in this sentence. 
19 Bloor,D., 1976,Knowledge and Social Imagery, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, p.8,11,13,2o. 
20 Ibid. , P. 8 • 
21 Ibid., pp.4-5. 
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the same types of cause. Besides, its patterns of explanation have 
to be applicable to sociology itself. This attempt is to explain 
causally the very content of science which is accepted to be true 
and rational, and accordingly excludes any sociological explanation. 
It seems to challenge the very autonomy of science which aims at the 
truth. Bloor applies his programme to mathematics and logic which 
is the last fortress of rationality and objectivity and to explain 
them by the social factors. 
I do not know the reason but the internalists who defend the 
rationality or objectivity of science are extremely afraid of the 
sociological analysis. In order to find the cause of their fear, I 
will look back to the origin of the sociology of knowledge. 
8. 
According to Merton, within the same society, when distrust or 
conflict between groups occurs because of the difference in the 
values, attitudes and modes of thought, one no longer inquires into 
the content of beliefs and assertions to determine whether they are 
valid or not in the light of the relevant evidence, but 'introduces 
an entirely new question: how does it happen that these view are 
maintained? Thought becomes functionalized; it is interpreted in 
terms of its psychological or economic or social or racial sources 
and functions.' 22 This questioning is the beginning of the 
sociol?gical approach to knowledge. And there is the common factor 
in these analyses, that is, 'discounting the face value of 
statements, beliefs and idea-systems,'n 
The beginning of the externalist approach was in the attempt to 
show that the opinion of the opposite is one-sided or limited and 
only the reflection of a certain group's interest by disclosing his 
class status, accordingly, alludes the falsity of his opinion. From 
a simple logical fact, however, it is impossible to prove the 
falsity of one's opinion through the external, sociological 
analysis. For if the existential determination implies falsity, the 
view that all knowledge is existentially determined, is itself 
existentially determined, therefore it cannot claim itself to be 
true. It was a natural consequence that most sociologists confined 
their investigation to the sociological analysis of the error which 
scientists made, in order to avoid the self-contradiction. 
But if truth does not exist, it is possible to show that you are 
existentially determined and I as well am existentially determined, 
therefore, in the case of the conflict between you and me, as a 
solution only the struggle remains. Though this is a self-
destructive way, it might be useful to show that the rationality and 
objectivity are but illusions. Some sociologists who intend to 
class-struggle will adopt such a step. Those who are agitated by 
this latter type of sociologists and as a result, refuse to accept 
any arguments and appeal to violence are genuine enemies of the 
n Merton[l968], p.511. 
" Ibid., p.512. Italics are in the original. 
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rationalists. Though the sociologists who try to criticize the 
rationality or objectivity of science by means of the rational 
argument are themselves rationalists, they are indirectly the 
enemies of the rationalists. Against those who appeal to violence, 
it is permitted for rationalists to use force, so it seems that 
there is no problem. But what happens if the public or mass 
distrusts rationalism and appeals to violence? It will be a 
disaster. The ideal of the rational unity of mankind will be 
destroyed. 
When Agassi wrote the following sentence, 'perhaps they [the 
internalists and externalists] are merely trying each to get more 
attention, public support, etc.,' 24 he might have expected this 
disastrous situation. In such a situation, it is vitally important 
to get more public support. At this point, the kosher problem 
becomes more important. What I can say on this problem is that both 
internalists and externalists theories are both defective and needs 
corrections.~ Accordingly, this case falls under the group which 
cannot be settled in the light of the available evidence. As an 
outsider I hope both will elaborate their own theories. 
9. 
Let us now return to Bloor. Bloor who is opposed to both the 
sociologists who are content with the sociology of errors and the 
internalists who refuse the sociological analysis of the inner logic 
of science, and who wishes to analyze the content of the knowledge, 
throws away the original tenet of the sociology of knowledge, that 
is, 'the idea that the existential determination implies falsity,' 
He says, 'Whether a belief is to be judged true or false has nothing 
to do with whether it has a cause. ' 26 
This is a striking statement. For an internalist, the 
externalist who does not insist or allude the falsity of the 
existentially determined is like a tamed wild beast. Or rather, it 
can be said that at last sociology becomes the genuine science 
getting rid of the state like third-rate newspaper which exclusively 
takes up the disclosure of a scandal or a gossip. Owing to Bloor, 
it is possible to analyze the same object in two ways, that is, the 
analysis of the causality and the analysis of validity. The 
externalists undertake the former and the internalists undertake the 
latter. What a peaceful coexistence! 
2
' Agassi [ 1978], p. 72. 
25 The existence of kosher problem itself shows that their theories 
are defective. 
,. Bloor[l976], p.l4. He writes,'The premise, that causation 
implies error,--- have been exposed and rejected. ' ( Italics are 
mine.) 
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